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RANGKA KERJA PENGESANAN BERLAPIS BOTNET BERDASARKAN 
PEMPROSESAN ISYARAT DAN ANALISIS MASA DISKRET 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Transaksi kewangan dalam talian dan maklumat sensitif yang banyak saling bertukar 
di Internet. Ini mengalih tumpuan penyerang siber daripada perasaan ingin tahu 
kepada mendapatkan keuntungan kewangan. Penyerang menggunakan perisian hasad 
yang berbeza untuk mencapai matlamat meraka. Botnet dianggap antara perisian 
hasad yang berbahaya kerana kuasanya yang mampu mengawal pelbagai mesin dan 
memberi ancaman kepada pengguna Internet. 
 
Tesis ini membentangkan suatu pendekatan baru dalam bidang pengesanan botnet. Ia 
memperkenalkan rangka kerja baru yang dinamakan Rangka Kerja Pengesanan 
Botnet Berlapis (LDBF) yang dapat mengesan rakan botnet dengan berkesan. 
Rangka kerja ini berfungsi dalam domain kekerapan dan bukannya dalam masa 
domain. LBDF dilengkapi dengan alogritma pengesan 'pengimbasan-hasad’. 
Alogritma LBDF menggunakan peraturan SYN, ACK (SNAK) untuk mengurangkan 
jumlah kesesakan rangkaian dan menukarkan trafik yang telah dikurangkan menjadi 
sampel data diskret. Kemudian LBDF mengaplikasikan kedua-dua periodogram dan 
fungsi autokorelasi membulat bagi mengesan sebarang keberkalaan tersembunyi di 
dalam jujukan sampel. Jika pelakuan berkala dikesan, kekerapan jujukan dan alamat 
IP komputer akan direkodkan. Oleh itu,  alamat komputer peribadi dengan pelakuan 
berkala akan disimpan ke  dalam pangkalan data dan dilabelkan sebagai 
mencurigakan. Jika mana-mana mesin yang mencurigakan menunjukkan pelakuan 
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pengimbasan-perosak, ia akan diisytiharkan sebagai bot. Bot yang mempunyai ciri 
yang sama dikumpulkan sebagai jenis botnet yang sama. Walaupun LBDF tidak 
mengesan bot yang tidak berkala atau tidak aktif contohnya, tidak berkomunikasi 
dengan master bot atau melakukan sebarang tindakan, ia akan mengesan mereka 
apabila mereka menunjukkan pelakuan yang mencurigakan. Pendekatan ini adalah 
berbeza dengan pendekatan lain kerana ia tidak terhad kepada protokol yang spesifik 
kepada protocol C&C (contohnya; HTTP, IRC) atau struktur botnet yang spesifik 
(contohnya; P2P, Berpusat) atau pelakuan serangan (iaitu; SPAM, DDOS) yang tidak 
memerlukan sebarang pengetahuan terdahulu bot yang dikesan.  
 
Penilaian LBDF menunjukkan bahawa algoritma pengesanan adalah tepat, pantas 
dan berskala jika dibandingkan dengan rangka kerja pengesanan yang ada. LBDF 
mampu mengesan P2P, HTTP, IRC, bot berpusat atau yang tidak berstruktur. 
Justeru, prestasi LBDF F-measure adalah 26% lebih baik berbanding rangka kerja 
pengesanan botnet yang lain. Hasil daripada pengaplikasian algoritma pengurangan 
trafik rangkaian yang diadaptasikan oleh  LBDF, kadar pengurangan dalam trafik 
yang dikaji adalah dalam julat 20%-90%, pengurangan ini meningkatkan prestasi 
LBDF dan meningkatkan daya pemprosesan tanpa menjejaskan matlamat utama 
LBDF. 
  
xxix 
 
LAYERED BOTNET DETECTION FRAMEWORK BASED ON 
SIGNAL PROCESSING AND DISCRETE TIME ANALYSIS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A massive volume of online financial transactions and sensitive information is 
exchanged over the Internet. This has shifted the focus of cyber attackers from 
curiosity to financial gain. Attackers use different malware to achieve their goals. 
Among the various forms of malware; the botnet is considered as the worst, because 
of its vast computing power, ability to control many machines and its significant 
threat to the Internet users. 
 
This thesis presents a new approach in the area of botnet detection. It introduces a 
framework called Layered Botnet Detection Framework (LBDF) that can detect 
botnet members efficiently. This framework works in the frequency domain rather 
than in the time domain. LBDF is equipped with a ‘malicious-scanning’ detection 
algorithm. The LBDF algorithm uses SYN, ACK (SNAK) rules to reduce the volume 
of network captured traffic and to convert the reduced traffic into discrete time 
sequences. Then LBDF applies both a periodogram and circular autocorrelation 
function to these sequences to detect any hidden periodicities. If periodic behavior 
were detected, the frequency of the sequence and the IP address of the monitored 
computer will be recorded. Thus the IP address of PCs with periodic behavior will be 
saved in a database and labeled as suspicious. If any of the suspicious machines 
performs a malicious-scanning action, it will be declared as a bot. Bots that have 
similar features are grouped together as members of the same botnet. 
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Although LBDF does not detect bots that are non-periodic or inactive i.e. not 
communicating with their bot master or performing any action, it will detect them as 
soon as they exhibit suspected bot behavior. The proposed approach is different than 
other approaches, since it is not limited to specific C&C protocols (e.g., HTTP, IRC) 
or to specific botnet structures (e.g., P2P, Centralized) or attack behaviors (i.e. 
SPAM, DDOS), neither does it require any prior knowledge of the detected bots.  
 
The evaluation of LBDF shows that the detection algorithm is accurate, fast and 
scalable compared to existing bot detection frameworks. LBDF is capable of 
detecting P2P, HTTP, IRC, centralized and even unstructured bots. In this respect, 
the LBDF F-measure is better by 26% compared with other botnet detection 
frameworks. As a result of applying the network traffic reduction algorithm adopted 
by LBDF, the reduction rate in the analyzed traffic was in a range of 20% - 90%, this 
reduction improves the performance of LBDF and increases its throughput without 
affecting the main goal of LBDF.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A few years ago, protecting a computer system or networks was mainly required to 
prevent the threat from viruses and worms.  Nowadays, the situation has changed 
drastically; the biggest threat faced by network hosts is malware, which is written by 
cyber programmers with the intent of malicious activities. Malware may take the 
form of viruses, worms, Trojans, botnet or other malicious programs.  
 
Among the various forms of malware, botnet is considered as the most serious means 
for conducting online crimes (FBI, 2011b). This threat is triggered due to its large 
scale and geographical diversity of the network hosts enlisted in a Botnet. The large 
number of enlisted bots; gave the Botnet its vast computing power (Guofei Gu, 
Roberto Perdisci, Junjie Zhang, & Wenke Lee, 2008). This vast computing power 
coupled with the easy controlling of botnet from anywhere in the world; makes the 
botnet a powerful cyber weapon and an effective tool for performing malicious 
activities. Botnets become sophisticated more and more every day by employing 
variety of techniques (e.g., sophisticated executable packers, rootkits, protocol 
evasion techniques, such as moving away from IRC and taking control of, HTTP, 
VoIP, IPV6, ICMP, Skype protocols, etc). Bots are more evasive to signature based 
detection systems, anomaly-based detection systems as well as DNS and data mining 
based intrusion detection systems. These evasion techniques; improve the 
survivability of botnets and the success rate of compromising new hosts. 
Additionally, botnets have also added (and continue to add) new mechanisms to hide 
traces of their communications. 
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1.1 The scale of Botnet problem  
A bot is defined as a computer that is compromised by malicious software that 
enables a remote computer to control it. Bots are part of a network of infected 
machines, known as a “botnet” that spread globally as shown in Figure 1.1.  The 
process of estimating botnet size and calculating the botnets population is a tedious 
task; the size and growth of botnets differ widely. For example, the Mariposa botnet 
(FBI, 2011a), it contains 12.7 million infected computers, while Zeus (Binsalleeh, et 
al., 2010) has more than 1,400 command and control servers with undetermined 
numbers of infected hosts. The figures are scary. The total number of zombies is near 
to 60 million. Table 1.1 shows some evaluations of the number of active bots at the 
end of 2010 according to Message Labs Intelligence 2010 Annual Security Report 
(Symantec, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Global Bot Infection, Bots are a global problem. The map shows the 
geographic locations of active bots at October 2010.(Symantec, 2011) 
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Table 1.1 State of Botnet at the end Of 2010 (CISCO, 2011) 
 
  
1.2 Research Motivation 
Regardless of how malware reaches a computer, the challenge is to identify the 
infected machine and heals it as soon as possible before any harm is caused. The past 
recent years are witnessed of different approaches that have been proposed to detect 
botnets and to combat their threat against cyber-security, but these approaches were 
based on a specific part of botnet lifecycle like, scan, spam, etc. or a specific 
abnormal behavior of a network traffic or, a specific communication protocols like, 
IRC, P2P and HTTP that are used by botnet Command and Control servers (C&C) or 
a certain topology e.g, centralized. All of these properties are specific properties and 
it is not necessary that all types of botnets contain it. Therefore, previous methods are 
suitable only for specific botnet type or structure. Diversity of botnet protocols and 
different structures; make botnet detection a very challenging task.  
 
 
 
Botnet Est.Botnet size Country of infection 
Rustock 1100k to 1700k USA (17%), Brazil (7%), India (7%) 
Grum 310k to 470 k  Russia (12%), India (8%), Vietnam (8%) 
Cutwail 560k to 840k  India (17%), Russia (16%), Ukraine (8%) 
Maazben 510k to 770k Russia (11%), India (10%), Brazil (7%) 
Mega-D 8ok to 120k  Russia (15%), Ukraine (14%), Brazil (7%) 
Cimbot 32k to 48k Italy (27%), Spain (25%), France (14%) 
Bobax 250k to 370k India (32%), Russia (25%), Ukraine (9%) 
Xarvester 17k to 25k Italy (15%), UK (10%), Poland (8%) 
Festi 8k to 12 k Vietnam(24%), Indonesia(21%), India 
Gheg 8k to 12 k Spain (12%), Indonesia (21%), India (10%) 
Unnamed 490k to 740k   
other 220k to 340k   
Total 3500k to 5400k India (9%), Russia (9%), USA (7%) 
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1.3 Problem Statement 
One of the most critical issues in Cyber Security is the botnet detection problem. 
Bots are stealthy in nature and usually do not aggressively consume 
CPU/memory/bandwidth resources, or perform noticeable damage to computers, 
such as disabling existing antivirus. Thus, a host-based solution method that is very 
specific to a certain botnet’s structure or a certain communication protocol is not 
desirable because: 
· Bots are flexible in their nature.  
· Continuously evolving with flexible design.  
· Different protocols and structures are used to organize and control the botnet. 
· Bot life cycle consists of several different stages and aspects that developed 
and changed continuously. 
 
That is why many existing Bot detection techniques become ineffective, as bots 
change their structure or C&C techniques. Despite the concerted efforts given in the 
literature, diversity of botnets protocols and structures makes botnet detection a 
challenging task and unsolved problem for the online community (ENISA, 2011; 
FBI, 2011a; IBM, 2010). Botnet detection problem can be solved through the 
detection of the command and C&C communication channels and the host’s 
malicious-activities that is proposed in this thesis. 
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1.4 Research Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to construct a new approach to detect botnet members 
in the monitored network. This approach is independent of botnet C&C protocols and 
structures. In addition, it does not require any priori knowledge (signature) of bots. It 
is assumed that the detection of the periodic C&C communication channels traffic 
together with the detection of the malicious-scan activities makes it possible to detect 
botnet members in the monitored network.  
 
Therefore, the main objectives of this thesis are: 
· To create a traffic representative that functions in frequency domain.  
· To detect bots, independent of the bots structure and the communication 
protocols used. 
· To evaluate the performance and accuracy of the proposed framework 
compared to other existing frameworks.  
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1.5 Thesis Contribution 
Computer users, applications and bots utilize network in the same manner, but with 
different intentions. The naïve nature of users and applications activities differs than 
the malicious activities performed by bots. The proposed framework should be able 
to distinguish the normal traffic caused by a legitimate user or applications from the 
malicious traffic caused by bot activity.  
 
The main expected contribution of this thesis is to propose and to design a new bot 
detection model. However, this thesis contribution summarizes as follow: 
Ø Traffic reduction, to introduce a new technique that will be able to create a 
true representative of the monitored network traffic with a discrete time 
sequences. 
Ø An algorithm that computes the PSD of the resultant Discrete Time 
Sequences, an algorithm that can be used to understand, and to model the 
normality of the network traffic in the frequency domain rather than the time 
domain. 
Ø A bot detection model with low false positives, a new detection model that 
is capable of identifying the existence of all known and unknown types of 
bots, independent of both, the botnet structure and the used communication 
protocols. 
Ø Enhanced model in terms of performance and accuracy, compared to the 
existing models. 
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1.6 Thesis Scope 
The scope of this work as shown in Figure 1.2 is limited to Inbound/Outbound, IPv4 
and TCP traffic, captured from the observed hosts in the monitored local area 
network (LAN). In the captured traffic, only details within the packet headers are of 
interest. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Thesis Scope 
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1.7 Research Framework 
Figure 1.3 describes the complete research framework of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current Botnet Detection 
Methods
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1: Literature review 
Phase 2: Literature Analysis 
Phase 3: System Design and Modeling 
Analyzer 
Algorithm
Periodicities 
Detection Algorithm
Traffic 
Reduction Algorithm
Scanning 
Detection Algorithm
Layered Approach Detection System
Problem Statement
Outlines Of Proposed Solution
Botnet Common 
Behaviors
Botnet Evasive 
Tools
Botnet Infection 
Mechanisms
Botnet 
Lifecycle
Detected Bot Families: IRC, HTTP, P2P  
Investigated Performance Parameters: 
Precision, Sensitivity, Accuracy and F-Measure 
Experimental Environment Preparation
System Validation and Result Analysis
Phase 4: Performance Evaluation 
 
Figure 1.3 Research Framework 
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1.8 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) presents the 
objectives of this thesis. It starts by presenting a background discussion for the Bot 
problem along with our research objectives and contributions. 
 
In Chapter 2, literature review will be presented along with some fundamental 
concepts related to this work and issues surrounding it. Other botnet detection 
models will be discussed, as well as the most current and related works related to 
botnet detection. This chapter also provided motivation for our work by describing 
some candidate architectures and the limitations of those proposed solutions. 
 
Chapter 3 covers the methodology discussion on how the proposed solution was 
designed. The algorithm to shift captured traffic from time domain to frequency 
domain, and to accurately -detect and specify- the frequency (time) of the monitored 
signal (traffic) will be introduced in this chapter.  
 
The implementation details and issues regarding the illustration of the detection 
model implementation were presented in Chapter 4. While the explanation of the 
performed experiments and the used datasets are presented in Chapter 5.  
 
The results obtained by the experiments in Chapter 5 are the primary content of 
Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 presents three main headings conclusion, 
recommendation and the possible future work for this study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Botnet threats are a magnified extension of previous computer threats, combined 
with C&C systems and capable of infecting hundreds of thousands of computer 
systems. Despite botnet recency, this area witnessed a significant number of 
researches and proposed solutions. In this chapter, an overview about botnets is 
introduced. Also, this chapter presents the botnet and the related researches including 
infection mechanisms, botnet communication protocols, C&C models, malicious 
behavior, previous and current, bot detection methods and botnet defense. Moreover, 
some related topics like periodic signals, periodograms and circular autocorrelation 
function, also will be discussed. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The related work that will be discussed in this chapter concerns previous approaches 
of botnet detection methods; their pros and cons. In particular, Signature Based, 
Anomaly Based, DNS Based and Data Mining Based Techniques will be discussed. 
Primarily focus will be concentrated on the efforts that have been made to detect 
botnets, based on known, anomalous, preprogrammed, repetitive and correlated 
behavior of botnet members. These effort’s advantages and disadvantage will be 
discussed individually. Moreover, a comparison between those models will be 
performed and some examples of each of them will be provided. 
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2.2 Background of Botnet 
For better understanding of botnet, some key terms are introduced that are related to 
the botnet community. The most related topics to botnet detection are shown in the 
general outline presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Botnet Overview 
 
2.2.1 Definitions Related to Botnet  
Ø Bot - the term bot comes from the word robot, which means "worker". In the 
world of computers, bot is a generic term, used to describe an automated 
process (Geer, 2005; Ianelli & Hackworth, 2005; Saha & Gairola, 2005). A 
bot is usually referred to as automated software, which is capable of 
performing certain predefined tasks repeatedly. 
Ø Botnet - are a group of compromised computers (or zombies) that are under 
the control of a single entity called botmaster (Barford & Yegneswaran, 
2007; Gu, Porras, Yegneswaran, Fong, & Lee, 2007; Saha & Gairola, 2005). 
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Ø Command and Control (C&C) is the commander channel that receives 
commands from the botmaster and conveys these commands to their bots in 
order to carry out various distributed and coordinated attacks remotely (B. 
AsSadhan, Moura, Lapsley, Jones, & Strayer, 2009; Bailey, Cooke, Jahanian, 
Xu, & Karir, 2009; Gu, Zhang, & Lee, 2008). 
 
Bot infected computers can be controlled as: 
· Directly, by initiating a connection with the infected computer known as the 
channel. Then, controlling it by commands hardcoded into the bot program, 
e.g. IRC and HTTP botnets. 
·  Indirectly, the bot initiates the connection with the control center/peer, sends 
a request and then performs the returned command e.g. P2P botnets.  
 
2.2.2 Current and Expected Future Structure of Botnet 
Botnet can be classified according to: 
 
· Topology 
· Communication protocols 
 
v Botnet Classification According to Topologies 
Botnets can be classified based on their C&C architectures as follows:  (Chao, Wei, 
& Xin, 2009). 
 
a- Centralized architecture: in a centralized architecture, all bots are connected 
to a certain centralized C&C server, such as IRC and HTTP based botnets as 
shown in Figure 2.2. This architecture is considered as the easiest to construct 
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and implement; that is why this structure is still in use in the cyber world till 
now. However, this architecture suffers from the one single point of failure 
architectures, where it is easy to identify the C&C server and thus, bring 
down the whole botnet.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 A typical Centralized Botnet structure. 
 
b- P2P or Decentralized architecture: shown in Figure 2.3, in this architecture 
there is no centralized point for C&C. So that any node in the network can act 
as a client and as a server, P2P architecture employs the P2P protocols to 
present a various distributed C&C servers. This architecture is considered 
difficult to discover and destroy, due to the anonymity and the distributed 
nature of the P2P architecture (Grizzard, Sharma, Nunnery, Kang, & Dagon, 
2007). 
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Figure 2.3 A typical Peer-to-Peer Botnet Structure 
 
c- Unstructured C&C architecture: shown in Figure 2.4 and considered to be 
the extreme case of P2P botnets; where each bot is connected to one peer and 
doesn’t know anything about other peers in the botnet, and more importantly, 
the bots in this structure are randomly organized (Clarke, Sandberg, Wiley, & 
Hong, 2001; Gnutella, March 2001). In this model there is no direct 
connection between the bot and the bot master; the bot master has to search 
the Internet and posts the required tasks to the bot when it finds one. Such a 
system is simple to design and to implement. The single bot detection would 
never compromise the whole botnet. However, this structure will not be 
effective as other structures; as it doesn’t have a guarantee of delivery and 
suffer from high message latencies.  
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Figure 2.4 A typical Unstructured Botnet structure 
 
The general properties of the different structures are summarized in Table 2.1 
 
Table 2.1 C&C topologies and basic properties (Bailey, Cooke, Jahanian, Xu, et al., 
2009) 
Topology Design Complexity Detectability 
Message 
Latency Survivability 
Centralized Low Medium Low Low 
Peer-to-Peer Medium Low Medium Medium 
Unstructured Low High High High 
 
 
v Botnet Classification According to Communication Protocols 
It is essential to have a communication channel between the bots and their owner, so 
that; the botnet owner can control his bots and send them the required commands. 
Establishing these channels (connections) and maintaining them are based on 
network communication protocols.  
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Therefore, based on the used network protocols; botnets can be classified as (Tyagi 
& Aghila, 2011): 
a- IRC-based: in this botnet, bots are controlled via Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 
channels. IRC was the first and the common protocol used by botmasters, to 
send commands to the infected machines. IRC can be easily detected and 
network security devices can be configured to block IRC traffic. 
b- IM-based: which uses communication channels provided by instant 
messaging (IM) services such as AOL, MSN, and ICQ etc. IM is Low 
popular botnet communication channel; because it is difficult to create an 
individual IM accounts for each bot. Bots should be online all the time and 
keep connected to the network. IM services do not permit the same account, 
to log on to the system, from more than one host at the same time; each bot 
needs its own IM account; because automatic account registration is 
prevented  in most of IM services. This will limit the number of registered IM 
accounts i.e. limits the number of concurrent online bots. 
c- Web-based: This technique is based on the popular communication HTTP 
protocol, which is difficult to be detected and can easily bypass network 
security devices. The botmaster controls his zombies from anywhere in the 
world through the World Wide Web by using the HTTP. The bot master 
defines a web server, the bot connects to the defined web server, receives 
commands and responses back to the same web server.  
d- Other: Botnets that use their own protocols to communicate, protocols that 
are based on the TCP/IP stack, i.e., that use transport-layer protocols such as 
TCP, ICMP and UDP. 
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2.2.3 How Bots Work 
Bots spread across the Internet by exploiting vulnerabilities on unprotected 
computers to infect them and to report back to their master. Then the bots stay 
hidden until they are instructed to carry out another task.  Based on 2010’s results, 
the top 20 most common vulnerabilities were found in software developed by four 
companies: Microsoft, Adobe, Oracle and ACDSee, as shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5 list of vulnerabilities among some of the well known softwares. 
 
The compromised computer can be used to carry out a variety of automated tasks. 
Such as, Sending (Spam, Viruses, and Spyware), stealing personal information 
(credit card numbers, bank credentials, email address lists and Other sensitive 
personal information), launching denial of service (DoS) attacks, clicking on internet 
ads to boost up web advertising billings and extortion in which attackers ask to be 
paid, or they will attack the online services or the website of a certain company. 
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2.2.4 Botnet evolution  
Like many services on the Internet, bots started as a useful tool without any 
malicious intent. Bots originally, were developed to sit on an IRC channel and 
perform several tasks, for its owner. Bots evolved from playing games with IRC 
users (GM: IRC bot, 1989, by Greg Lindahl), to a password stealer and backdoor 
(PrettyPark, 1999  'Trojan.PSW.CHV’), then it has the ability to remote control IRC 
clients by utilizing IRC vulnerabilities (SubSeven Trojan/Bot:By the late 1990s) 
(Tyagi & Aghila, 2011). 
 
In 2000, Global Threat (GTBot) appeared, this bot can execute commands in 
response to events on the IRC server, and it supports raw TCP and UDP socket 
connections. GTbot had the capabilities of port scanning, flooding and cloning etc.  
(Jing Liu, Yang Xiao, Kaveh Ghaboosi, Hongmei Deng, & Jingyuan Zhang, 2009). 
In 2002, SDBot appeared which represents a new era in the evolutionary chain for 
bots with available source code, which made it accessible to many hackers. 
Moreover these types were easy to modify and to maintain (Jing Liu, et al., 2009). In 
2002 bots with modular design appeared (Agobot, aka Gaobot, 2002), the modular 
design; allows the botmaster to update modules as new techniques or sites are 
available (Kola, 2008). 
 
The available bot evolution techniques, lead to the creation of botnet that depends on 
unique characteristics, rather than depending on the original code, like Spybot and 
MyTob, for example (Polybot, March of 2004) has the capability to appear in many 
different forms.  The use of hybrid, social engineering and spoofed e-mail addresses 
appeared with (Mytob, 2005). Botnets moved away from the original IRC Command 
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& Control channel, and began to communicate over HTTP, ICMP and SSL ports, 
Fast Flux network based on DNS servers and of course the P2P protocols. (Sinit, 
2003) is an example of the early malicious Peer-to-Peer bot. In January 2007, the 
Trojan.Peacomm bot appeared; it was the most recently known peer-to-peer bot 
(Chao, et al., 2009).  
 
After exploiting all available protocols, botnet developers turned their attention to 
network architecture, moving their botnets structure from the legacy classic 
architecture (i.e. a centralized structure with one or more C&C), into the dynamic 
P2P structure, which has no C&C, large botnet based on P2P architecture appeared in 
2007. P2P botnet have attracted Bonet developer as well as botnet researcher. 
 
2009 was characterized by the increased sophistication and the complex malicious 
programs that have rootkit functionality, for example the year 2009 witnessed (global 
epidemics, web attacks, web botnets, SMS fraud, the use of new platforms such as 
Mac OS and mobile operating systems and attacks on social networks) (Szor & 
Kaspersky).  
 
2010, The Year of the Vulnerability (Bail, 2011), Web malware grew by 139 percent 
in 2010 compared to 2009 as shown in Figure 2.6. Numbers of used botnet-
technologies have progressed dramatically. Botnet is constantly growing more and 
more complex, (e.g. Mariposa, ZeuS, Bredolab, TDSS, Koobface, Sinowal and Black 
Energy 2.0 botnets); which are considered among the most sophisticated malware 
ever created. 2010 also witnessed compound efforts of law enforcement agencies, 
antivirus vendors and telecom providers in trapping of cybercriminal and illegal 
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services or business on the Internet. The P2P share was present to declare an increase 
in peer-to-peer (P2P) activity and again to focus more on the rule of P2P in the future 
direction of botnet.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 The growth of Web Malware for the years (2006-2010). 
 
Also it was noticed that in the year 2010, attackers have shifted from internet and 
user’s pc toward mobiles. A significant increase in mobile malwares gives us a black 
picture for the future of mobile botnets as shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Total Mobile Operating System Vulnerabilities for the years 2006 to 
2010, IBM 
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2.2.5 Botnet Potential Benefits 
 Botnets constructing have one or more of the following information processing, 
information harvesting and information dispersion. Information processing is used to 
process data, such as cracking passwords. While the use of information harvesting 
may includes obtaining financial data, password data, identity data, relationship data 
(i.e., email addresses, list of friends) or any available data on the host. Information 
dispersion includes providing false information from illegally controlled sources, 
creating denial of service attacks and sending out spam. 
 
2.2.6 Botnet Infection Mechanisms  
Botnets utilize many different infection mechanisms, such as employing malware 
(i.e. worms, trojan insertion), web driven-by download, mobile media, vulnerability 
exploitation, mail attachments, automatically scan-exploit-and-compromise, 
traditional file-based viruses, network share, as well as social engineering techniques 
and P2P file sharing networks, etc (Chao, et al., 2009).  
 
2.3 Botnet Life Cycle & Detection Systems 
Creating Botnet begins by sending a malware to vulnerable machines. Once 
vulnerability is found, the machine will be compromised; leading to the malicious 
bot binaries to be downloaded into the compromised hosts, turning it into a zombie 
(bot). This new bot in return will be redirected to a dynamic/static server address that 
is known for both the bot and his master. This server is known as a C&C server, 
where the botmaster (attacker) can login and issue commands to his bots to start an 
attack, scanning, infection…etc, (Chao, Wei et al. 2009). The most general phases in 
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Botnet lifecycle are: spread, infection, C&C, and attack, as shown in Figure 2.8. 
Botnet life cycle events include: 
1- Victim browses a website or clicks a link on email (e.g. phishing, drive-
by download), then the browser is redirected to a malicious dropper site.  
2- Victim is directed into downloading the dropper - or dropper is 
automatically downloaded through an exploit.  
3- Dropper unpacks on the infected machine and runs.  
4- Dropper informing its botmaster that it joined to the botnet.  
5- The C&C secure the new client, sends encrypted malware with new 
instructions. 
6- Dropper decrypted the malware and installs it. The dropper has to vanish 
by hiding, or delete itself so that users believe that no infection has 
occurred. Infected machine is turned into zombie (bot) 
7- Malware contacts C&C, sends passwords/data/etc. as encrypted payload.  
8- C&C updates the bot status and sends new instructions. 
9- Bot responds by executing the commands and performing the required 
actions.  
10- The bot contacts C&C sending its report. 
11- In certain situations the bot is recommended to erase all commands and 
vanishes to remove any evidence on the botnet existence. 
 
Steps 7, 8, 9 and 10 repeat indefinitely with the malware ‘evidence’ and C&C 
connection instructions changing constantly.  The malware can be told to lay silent 
for a specified period of time. 
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Figure 2.8 botnet life cycle. 
 
 
Analyzing the malware after it enters the organization to obtain C&C details, can 
help removing it. Unfortunately, analyzing alone will not be enough as the infection 
lifecycle changes so quickly in a way that the analyzed malware no longer exists on 
the victim’s machine. 
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2.4 Botnet Detection Methods 
How the host is infected is not important as how to heal it, once the bot is created 
within the network hosts, the first priority is to identify the infected host and to heal 
it. Therefore, many efforts were initialized to detect botnets. The past recent years 
witnessed different approaches that have been proposed to detect botnets and to 
combat their threat against cyber-security. These approaches can be grouped into 
Signature Based, Anomaly Based, DNS based and Data Mining Techniques.  
 
2.4.1 Signature-based Detection 
Signature-based Detection explained in Figure 2.9 examines the network traffic for 
known patterns of a malicious activity; new types of attacks are not detected. 
Signature-based detection involves searching among network traffic, for a series of 
bytes or packet sequences or a set of attributes and matches them against a set of 
predetermined attribute lists. In case some particular network traffic has a match, the 
system has to alert administrators or to take a pre-defined action. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: a simplified figure representing a signature-based detection model 
 
